Introduction
For just over 20 years the story of Irish social partnership has attracted a wave of attention from academics and policy-makers all over the world (see Auer; Baccaro, 2002; Sabel; 1996) . The fact that Ireland, with its historically antagonistic, fragmented Anglo-Saxon industrial relations (IR) system, was capable of maintaining such a distinctive, corporatist-style system of socioeconomic governance for so long fascinated and befuddled in equal measure.
Throughout much of this period, too, the 'Celtic Tiger' economic success that accompanied the experiment in social partnership was the 'poster child' of the smart, modern economy. It seemed Ireland could have it all; astonishing growth in wealth creation and employment coupled with a socially-inclusive governance structure.
The events of the past couple of years following the financial and social crisis that has gripped most of the Western world have brought the Irish social partnership juggernaut crashing to a halt. The country is presently in the grip of a deep economic recession. While international economic events have impacted almost everywhere, worries had long been expressed about the light regulation of financial institutions (domestic and otherwise) and an over-heated property market in Ireland. i The recent 'bursting' of national financial and housing bubbles, coupled with the government's 2008 decision (endorsed by the EU) to State guarantee all banking debt has meant that the crisis in Ireland is particularly severe. In this context, the social partners have, for the first time in two decades, been unable to negotiate a new national pact and the Irish IR system exists in a state of acute uncertainty and flux.
This article begins by describing the core elements of social partnership, before going on to examine key factors involved in the demise of the Irish model and some of the broader implications that can be drawn. It should be noted, first, that the factors identified here did not emerge with the crisis, but these pre-existing weaknesses exacerbated the demise of social partnership once the extent of the crisis became apparent. Secondly, this article will characterise social partnership as a process borne of, and sustained by, extreme pragmatism; a pragmatism, indeed, that is characteristic both of the Irish IR tradition and political system.
Where the impact of the crisis intersects with both of these points can be summed up, rather inelegantly, as the point at which the money ran out.
emerged as a pragmatic response by the social partners to a desperate situation:
we will equally see how pragmatism informs a shift in the parties' positions when crisis strikes again twenty years on.
Secondly, virtually all accounts accept that social partnership became, over time, a very definite and distinctive process. Centralised bargaining was not new to Irish IR (Hardiman, 1988) , but what distinguished social partnership after 1987
was the all-encompassing nature of the social pacts, which gradually expanded to cover most areas of socio-economic policy-making, and integrated into the process 'new' social partners (civic, community and voluntary groups. As we will see below, however, it may be that, over time, the process became the point.
This time it really is different…
Many comprehensive and erudite accounts of the Irish partnership process are readily available (see Roche, 2007) . To review briefly, seven tripartite social pacts were concluded between 1987 and 2009: The Programme for National Recovery (PNR, 1987 (PNR, -1990 
; The Program for Social and Economic
Progress (PESP, 1990 (PESP, -1993 ; The Program for Competitiveness and Work (PCW, 1993-1996) The agreements have always centred on trade-offs between wage moderation, fiscal restraint and tax concessions. The agreements have also addressed other core labour market issues such as industrial peace, labour market flexibility, active labour market policy and social welfare reform. The next sections will try and account for the inability of the social partners to conclude a social pact in the face of the recent crisis (as they were able to do in the dire circumstances of the 1980s). The focus will, first, be on issues relating to the primary actors (the State, the employers and the unions) and then shifts to the social partnership process.
Where did it all go wrong? The actors

The State
The origins of the Irish social partnership process are often traced back to the publication in 1986 of a highly influential report (A Strategy for Development 1986 -1990 by the tripartite advisory body, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). As Hamann and Kelly (2007) Stimulus proposals agreed by the construction social partners, for example, were ignored, because, as one ICTU official put it, the 'government was so busy with the banks it wouldn't make any other decisions' (author interview; August, 2010).
Despite the longevity of the partnership process, the fundamental fact of the State's driving role meant that at no time since 1987 did the social partners challenge the main tenets of government economic policy (Teague and Donaghy, 2009a) . Thus, unions did not seek to trade wage restraint for progressive redistribution policies, but instead for a reduced taxation burden on workers and institutional influence. Such a strategy worked well in times of growth, when tax reductions and moderate wage increases were possible, but once the crisis hit concessions were required. As unions and employers struggled to jointly respond to the economic downturn, the government quickly reverted to a unilateral approach of public service, spending and welfare cuts, and tax increases. When the money ran out, the dominant partner very quickly packed up the partnership tent.
While employers were initially somewhat reluctant to embrace tripartite bargaining in 1987, the main employer representative groups (led by the IBEC) have subsequently been key supporters of the process. Roche (2007: 421) has argued that the peculiar nature of Irish social partnership involved a refashioning of hierarchical control mechanisms (enforced, under 'classical' corporatist arrangements, by all-encompassing and hierarchically co-ordinated partner associations) so that the core participants were able, and prepared, to isolate groups of workers or employers whose activities were seen to be threatening the process. This was done through applying moral or social pressure on noncompliant groups and through copper-fastening the role of the 'older' State institutions for IR conflict resolution, the Labour Relations Commission and Labour Court.
However, it seems that the social partners have become increasingly unable (unwilling?) to 'discipline', in particular, recalcitrant employers. Writing a decade ago, Heery (2001: 315) noted that 'while the official discourse of European industrial relations deploys the language of "partnership," there is evidence of European employers becoming less tolerant of unions than in the past'. Sheehan This, of course, is a key tenet of the argument of the 'incorporation' theorists, who see the ultimate aim and outcome of a 'partnership' strategy as the demobilisation of union resistance to employer interests (Allen, 2000; Kelly, 1998) .
The Unions
Since 1987, the Irish trade union movement has pursued a strategy of exchanging wage moderation and industrial peace for policy and institutional influence (Teague and Donaghy, 2009) . The extent to which unions did, in fact, secure institutional influence through the partnership process has provoked considerable debate. One the one hand, the unions can point to a considerable body of protective labour legislation agreed during partnership talks and then progressed through the normal legislative process (Donaghy and Teague, 2007) ;
for example on a national minimum wage, 'exceptional' collective redundancies and regulation of employment agencies. v However, it must be emphasised again that such measures ultimately require the imprimatur of the government before they become law. So, for example, the much-trumpeted package of legislative reforms on compliance with labour standards, agreed in 2006 in response to large-scale disputes involving the exploitation of migrant workers (Krings, 2009) , has yet to pass into law. This follows a backlash against the measures by employer groups (Dobbins, 2008) and, in particular, small-medium sized businesses, which have been lobbying local politicians on the issue.
It is the failure of the labour movement to extend its influence beyond the level of national talks, though, that has arguably dealt the biggest blow to union partnership advocates. Two principal approaches to strengthening unions' workplace role were agreed through partnership. In the mid-1990s, the social partners outlined a voluntary framework promoting the diffusion of workplace partnership, based on the template of the national process. P2000 defined 'enterprise partnership' and identified nine areas in which the concept would be particularly apposite. vi Despite the promotion of workplace partnership, the empirical evidence has shown that its incidence and significance, especially in the private sector, is limited (Geary, 2007; O' Connell et al; Thus, 20 years of social partnership have not resulted in a strengthening of workplace organisation and the extent to which soidisant institutional influence has compensated for this is questionable. Over the partnership period, union density, and industrial action, levels have continued to decline (Walsh and Strobl, 2009 ). It would be intemperate to draw a causal connection here, as these are problems that have been experienced by union movements all over the Western world. The difficulty for Irish unions is that, for a considerable period, social partnership has been viewed as 'the only game in town' (Donaghy and Teague, 2007: 39) . Given the centralised nature of the process and the no-strike clauses in the agreements, the breakdown of the process leaves a generation of union representatives and activists with no experience of engaging in collective bargaining or taking collective action. Organisational weakness, of course, makes the unions considerably less attractive as a social partner. We will return to this point below in considering union responses to recent government actions.
The Process
Means and ends
The Irish partnership model was distinguished by its all-encompassing nature; a broad range of actors addressing an array of policy issues. Those focusing on the 'deliberative' nature of the process have tended to emphasise its 'problemsolving' approach to creating shared understandings and social consensus , a feature of the process manifested in the 'increasingly elaborate institutional architecture' of social partnership (Roche, 2007: 418) . The process, too, placed considerable emphasis on producing procedural consensus between the key actors to guide the search for solutions to identified challenges (Teague, 2001 ).
However, a stabilised system that knows procedurally how to search for solutions does not necessarily produce functional outcomes; over time the 'fit between agreements and economic context', which may once have been intentional or serendipitous, can subsequently become 'dysfunctional, all within broadly the same framework of negotiations' (Hardiman, 2007; 5-6) . There has been a question mark over the capacity of the partnership process to 'deliver', outside the core areas of pay, tax reform and industrial peace. In form, the agreements are akin to political manifestos; an introduction that lays out the approach and context, chapters or frameworks based on themes (tax reform, workplace relations, social inclusion, etc), and, throughout, numbered, specific actions or commitments. The first agreement (the PNR) was 32 pages in length; the latest (T2016) ran to 139 pages.
What is striking is the number of commitments that pledge to submit an issue to 'review', usually by means of establishing a working group or task force;
Hardiman (2006) by the parties that very few concrete initiatives had emerged from the various task forces and their incidence was subsequently scaled back (Donaghey, 2008) .
Moreover, once the crisis struck, and fiscal difficulties meant the opportunities for review and compromise were circumscribed, the government ultimately took the 'hard' decisions, settling little store by the views of partnership actors or institutions. It was quite happy to dismantle the institutional architecture.
Furthermore, a focus on deliberation tends to obscure the fact that the role of the 'social pillar' or CVP, has ultimately come to be seen as rather marginal to the main business of social partnership, which centred on the State and the labour market actors. ix As Larragy (2006: 20) notes:
'The main bargaining chip the CVP has in social partnership is whether it rejects or signs off on a deal. But just how far it could "play it" depends on the political context -or what such a rejection might cost a government in popularity…the threatened rejection of Sustaining Progress in 2002 by a section of the Pillar resulted only in that section's expulsion from the partnership process' (ibid: 20; emphasis added).
When unemployment was a political priority in the 1980s and 1990s, the governments of the day were grateful for the legitimacy conferred by engaging with organisations representing the unemployed and other civil society associations (and, indeed, the unions); when the realpolitik was deemed to demand social welfare and public service cuts in the wake of the crisis, these organisations' voice was quickly ignored.
The public sector, reform and resistance
Given that trade union density is significantly higher amongst public servants, the public sector unions (in particular the State's second-largest union, the Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union-IMPACT) have always had a key role in shaping and sustaining the process. The literature on social partnership has tended to emphasise the pay benefits wrought for public sector workers by their unions (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007) in exchange for which the State received commitments on industrial relations stability (Donaghy and Teague, 2007) . Much less attention, however, has been placed on the focus of the partnership agreements on public sector reform, particularly after 1997.
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008: 18) , Ireland has 'significantly advanced along a New Public Management (NPM) continuum' of public sector reform which has explicitly sought the input of the social partners. An elaborate performance management system was devised, through partnership, for the public sector whereby the payment of agreed salary increases for public employees depends upon cooperation with satisfactory local implementation of the modernisation agenda set out in national agreements.
x Performance Verification Groups (PVGs) for different sectors (health, local government, etc) were established to make recommendations as to whether or not pay increases should be granted. In all cases, it was envisaged that the process of reform and implementation of change, outlined in the national agreements, would be accompanied by 'robust' workplace partnership structures 'characterised by high levels of employee and union involvement with management' (NCPP, 2005: 30) . However, Doherty and Erne (2010) have argued that, despite this democratic and inclusive rhetoric, public sector workplace partnership has been used in a managerialist manner to steer through a pre-determined reform agenda, which seeks tighter, more controlling management structures, constricts employee autonomy and which risks undermining the core public service ethos. This, again, suggests a version of 'deliberative democracy' that is largely instrumental; the use of partnership as a legitimisation tool (see Bacon and Samuel (2009: 245) for a similar discussion in the UK context).
Ultimately, it was the issue of public sector reform that proved to be the final nail in the partnership coffin. As the crisis became more acute and the dire state of the public finances more apparent, the ICTU produced proposals for a national recovery plan. The union movement generally has accepted the need for a 'fiscal adjustment' aimed at reducing the exchequer deficit (see, particularly, the ICTU plan, A Better, Fairer Way), xi whilst arguing for a longer-time frame in which to make the adjustment, and a greater focus on job creation and protection for the lower-paid and welfare recipients than that proposed by government. In December 2009, it seemed the social partners had agreed a new national pact, which promised further extensive reforms of public sector work practices in return for no further pay reductions (O ' Kelly, 2010) . At the core of the deal was a plan for 12 days' unpaid leave for public sector workers. Although unpaid leave is a fairly conventional way of addressing commercial difficulties in the private sector (akin to the recent policy of reducing working time in Germany and the Netherlands), the plan was denounced by many sections of the media as a 'cave in' to the public sector unions (Roche, 2010) alternatives. This has had a number of consequences.
First, the determination to negotiate a partnership pact has meant that, on a number of occasions, plans for co-ordinated industrial action have been postponed or cancelled in response to offers of fresh talks from the government and/or employer groups (McDonagh and Dundon, 2010) . Most spectacularly, a planned one-day strike in late-November 2009 was postponed in order to allow the ill-fated 'unpaid leave' deal to be concluded. The ICTU leadership has managed, to date, to more or less maintain unity throughout the crisis. However, the strategy it has pursued has focused predominantly on negotiation and conciliation through the partnership process, has been dominated by propartnership union leaders and has resulted in the frustration of a number of smaller unions, which favoured earlier and more prolonged campaigns of outright industrial action (for example, some of the teacher unions and the general, UKbased union, Unite). Fears that the unions were not merely unwilling, but would be unable, to engage in strike action were, to an extent, borne out in early 2009
when IMPACT failed to secure the two-thirds majority of votes required from its membership to partake in a planned (but, inevitably, postponed) national day of action.
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that the union movement has focused exclusively on a partnership strategy, as co-ordinated union action has taken place. Two ICTU-organised protest marches were held (on a Saturday in overtime ban) has taken place in sectors of the public service. The strike weapon (with the exception of a one-day work stoppage by some 13,000 lower paid civil servants in early 2009), however, remained conspicuously unutilised until, after many false starts, around 250,000 public sector workers engaged in the country's largest ever one-day strike in November 2009. However, as noted, a planned follow-up strike was postponed to allow partnership talks to re-commence.
Thus, 'traditional' resistance strategies have been employed. However, in addition to being limited in scope and duration, these have featured, almost exclusively, public sector workers. Private sector workers, for example, were 'encouraged' to attend the protest marches, but few seemed to be visible. A particularly damaging legacy for the unions from the breakdown of partnership has been the emergence of a perceived 'divide' between workers in the private and public sector workforces, which has dominated recent public discourse in
Ireland. Some commentators, pointing to the fact that the general public perception of unions is largely positive (see Geary, 2007) , focused on the role of the media in this regard. As Roche (2010) puts it:
'In the print media, in particular…it seemed that "open season" had been declared on social partnership and that it had effectively become tainted through its association with the nexus of failed institutions of the Celtic Tiger era… it would be reasonable to suggest that media commentary […] channelled and even seeded public disaffection with unions, public servants and social partnership'. 
Conclusion
The Irish trade union movement, after 20 years of partnership, finds itself at a crossroads. The legacy of that era seems to be, first, a more fragmented movement. This has revealed itself, damagingly, in the manner in which private and public sector workers have been 'pitted' against one another; most injuriously in terms of public perception. It will be difficult for the ICTU, in the medium-term at least, to maintain a unified public-private strategy, as it was able to do during the partnership years. Within the public sector union movement itself there has been fragmentation, with the formation of new, loosely-structured groupings and a questioning of the hitherto axiomatic use of the majority vote within Congress. The acquiescence to the NPM reform agenda by public sector unions and staff, copper-fastened by partnership agreements since the late 1990s, the recent concessions granted under the Croke Park Agreement, and ongoing media-and public?-hostility to the public service may ultimately result in a less supportive State approach to public sector unionisation than has historically been the case. This would, from a union perspective, be a disastrous by-product of the collapse of partnership.
In the private sector, unions also face steep challenges. Employer representative groups seem less able (or willing) to hold their constituency together in the face of challenges from increasingly vocal anti-union employers, seemingly emboldened by the failure of unions to strengthen their representation and bargaining rights. Attempts to secure such rights have backfired spectacularly, with 'workplace partnership' largely non-existent and the legal environment extraordinarily hostile. In fact, it is possible that a constitutional amendment would be required to fully reverse the effects of jurisprudence in this area (including the Ryanair decision). The trade union movement is unlikely to relish campaigning for such a move given the damaging public association of the unions and social partnership with the policy and institutional calamities of the Celtic Tiger era.
However, the case can also be made that the crisis presents an opportunity for a re-thinking and renewal of union strategies. Nascent strategies of resistance have begun to emerge. These are 'traditional', in the form of industrial action (the potential for which was so heavily circumscribed under partnership), but also 'new', in the manner in which fresh union groupings are being formed, and, especially, the manner in which unions have begun linking and campaigning with other civil society groups outside of the social partnership structures under which the latter were so marginalised.
xiv This article has argued that, ultimately, the Irish case can be categorised as one of 'pragmatic partnership'. It seems unlikely that the partnership process as it developed since 1987 will be revived; the achievements of the partly selfsustaining partnership 'industry' (of working groups, task forces and 'insider' networks) that emerged remain debatable. To some extent the process generated its own momentum; as long as the tune of economic growth and employment creation was playing, the participants (whether music-lovers or not!) seemed unwilling to get off the dance-floor for fear of being left, lonely, at the margins. However, when the music stopped, the weakness of the 'deliberative governance' aspect of partnership was demonstrated. While deliberation and problem-solving became ingrained in the partnership process, 'hard' decisionmaking and policy implementation remained centralised and, ultimately, subject to governmental whim. When the 'perfect storm' of a global economic crisis, a domestic banking meltdown and a rapid decline in prosperity hit in 2007, the partnership model, given its weak ideological foundations, proved unable to adapt and renew itself. The partners quickly (and brutally) brought an end to the affair.
